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Introduction
This paper is concerned with the theory of exchange-rate pass-through to prices (henceforth, ERPT or simply pass-through). According to international trade theory, if transportation costs are negligible, retail prices should be very responsive to exchange rate changes. However, the typical ndings of the empirical literature challenge this view.
Understanding the degree to which exchange rate variations are transmitted to prices is a perennial topic of discussion among scholars; however, in addition, few, if any, policymakers would seek to guide monetary policy while ignoring the e ect of exchange rates on prices.
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We examine pass-through in a model of dispersed information based on the assumption that the nominal exchange rate imperfectly transmits information about the underlying fundamentals. Monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers in the Foreign country (exporters) sell their production to monopolistically competitive nal goods producers in the Home country. The Home nal goods producers use the Foreign intermediate goods as inputs to produce consumer goods. We consider the case where rms face uncertainty concerning two relevant fundamentals representing the economic conditions of the Home and Foreign countries, but they have access to noisy private signals about these fundamentals. All rms also observe a noisy public signal, the nominal exchange rate, relating the two fundamentals. We solve our model for the unique (linear) equilibrium and evaluate ERPT. If information is complete, ERPT is also complete, meaning that a 1% change in local currency prices for both intermediate imported goods and domestic nal goods results from a 1% change in the exchange rate. Under dispersed information, however, our model is consistent with three stylized facts of the empirical pass-through literature:
1. Incomplete Pass-Through: ERPT lies between 0 and 1; 2. Exchange Rate-Consumer Price (ERCP) Puzzle : ERPT is usually higher for intermediated imported goods prices than for consumer prices; and 3. Macroeconomic Environment: ERPT is related to macroeconomic stability.
To focus on the informational content of exchange rates, we exclude from our model important factors in explaining pass-through suggested by the theoretical literature.
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While the theoretical literature typically assumes exporters setting prices in the consumers' currency (local currency pricing) and signi cant local costs of assembly and distribution, our approach relies on exporters setting their prices in their own currency (producer currency pricing) and ignores substantial local inputs and distribution costs.
As a result, we convey our main intuition in a simple and stylized auto-parts model to highlight that our results are primarily driven by the signaling role of the exchange rate under dispersed information.
The rationale of our approach is based on three central issues in macroeconomics. The rst is the role of private and public signals under dispersed information. The second is the link between economic fundamentals and exchange rate behavior. The third is the relation of macroeconomic stability and pass-through. We consider these three issues below.
Private and Public Signals under Dispersed Information. In recent years, there has been growing interest in models that feature heterogeneous information about aggregate economic conditions and a moderate degree of complementarity in actions.
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Following this literature, this paper takes steps toward linking dispersed information and exchange rates in the spirit of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) , who introduced information dispersion about future macroeconomic fundamentals in a dynamic rational expectations model in order to explain the Exchange Rate Determination Puzzle. We, instead, use a very simple and stylized model to focus on the information content of exchange rates to explain pass-through to prices.
We base our discussion on a model where individual consumer prices depend not only on fundamentals but also on the mean of imported input prices. In our model, the relevant fundamentals are not observable. Instead, rms observe noisy private and public 2 We present a brief review of the literature in Section 2. 3 These models were used to capture applications such as the e ects of monetary or scal policy, as in Woodford (2002) , Angeletos and Pavan (2009) and Lorenzoni (2009) , and the welfare e ects of public information dissemination, as in Morris and Shin (2002) , Hellwig (2005) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007) . signals about these fundamentals. In the terminology of the relevant literature following Morris and Shin (2002) , the nominal exchange rate works as an exogenous public signal of the underlying fundamentals 4 . Under dispersed information, equilibrium prices depend on the relative precisions of private and public information. As the precision of the public signal increases, more weight is given to the nominal exchange rate in the price-setting process.
Fundamentals and Exchange Rates. Although economic theories state that the exchange rate is determined by macroeconomic fundamental variables, such as money supplies, a long-standing puzzle in international economics is the di culty of tying oating exchange rates to such fundamental variables. This di culty was rst established by Meese and Rogo (1983) using data from the 1970s to evaluate the out-of-sample t of several models of exchange rates. The work of Cheung, Chinn and Pascual (2005) reaches the same conclusion for recent available models.
Recent works, however, o er new insights into the relation between exchange rates and fundamentals. Engel and West (2005) demonstrate that in a rational expectations present value model, under the assumptions that fundamentals are nonstationary and the discounting factor is near unity, the exchange rate will behave as a`near' random walk process. This implies that the di culty of predicting exchange rates using fundamentals may well be consistent with conventional exchange rate determination models. Sarno and Valente (2009) , employing a predictive procedure that allows the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals to evolve over time, nd that the weak out-of-sample predictive ability of exchange rate models may be caused by poor performance of model selection criteria rather than by a lack of information content in the fundamentals. In order to explain the exchange rate determination puzzle, the model of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) implies that observed fundamentals account for very little of the exchange rate volatility in the short to medium run, but over long horizons, the exchange rate is closely related to observed fundamentals.
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Following this recent literature, we link exchange rates and fundamentals assuming that the nominal exchange rate follows an exogenous stochastic process compounded by fundamentals plus a white noise component. We interpret this noise term as short-run deviations from the "fundamental" exchange rate value. By choosing the variance of this noise term, we determine how important fundamentals are to explain the exchange rate.
Macroeconomic Environment and ERPT. In our model, the noise terms present on the private signals about a speci c fundamental captures macroeconomic instability of the country to which this fundamental is related (country-speci c volatility). Analogously, the nominal exchange rate noise may represent instability of the macroeconomic environment unrelated to any speci c country ("global" volatility). As the precision of the noise term increases, the link between exchange rates and fundamentals becomes stronger.
Our approach is based on the role of macroeconomic variables in explaining the facts that (i) pass-through is higher for emerging market countries and (ii) declines over time for both advanced and emerging market countries. 6 Taylor (2000) conjectured that these two facts were due to changes in the macroeconomic environment, particularly changes in the level and variability of in ation. 7 More precisely, monetary policy aimed at keeping in ation low and stable may, by anchoring in ation expectations, increase rms' readiness to absorb exchange rate uctuations in their pro t margins. In a more stable in ationary environment, exchange rate shocks may be perceived as more temporary. Other determinants of the decline in the exchange rate pass-through are openness and country size. Soto and Selaive (2003) show that pass-through seems to be higher when a country is
smaller and more open.
Organization. We introduce our model in the next section and compare our approach to the literature in Section 2. We then present our major results in Section 4. We provide concluding remarks in Section 5 while the Appendix contains proofs omitted in 6 Section 2 brie y covers both the empirical and theoretical literature on ERPT.
7 Examples of studies showing that high in ation is often associated with complete pass-through are Choudhri and Hakura (2006) , Devereux and Yetman (2002) and Ca'Zorzi, Hahn and S anchez (2007) . Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) also nd in ation variability to be a determinant of the decline in pass-through.
the main text.
Comparison to the Literature
Our explanation for ERPT is quite di erent from what is typically found in the theoretical pass-through literature. With its dispersed information framework, where the nominal exchange rate conveys information about domestic and foreign fundamentals, our model is consistent with the main facts of the empirical literature, even ignoring local currency pricing and substantial local inputs or distribution costs. We proceed by considering each stylized fact in turn.
Incomplete ERPT. A substantial body of empirical work documents that exchange rate pass-through to prices is delayed and incomplete.
8 Although most of the literature uses aggregate data, works about speci c industries present similar results.
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The rst explanation relies on the behavior of exporting rms. Under local currency pricing (LCP), exporting rms x the import price in the local currency of the market to which they are exporting. Exchange rate movements therefore need not be re ected in local currency prices. The other extreme is producer currency pricing (PCP), where prices of imported goods are quoted in foreign currency and imported goods are sold to consumers for local currency at the going market exchange rate. In such a case, any change in the exchange rate will be automatically transmitted to the consumer prices of the importing country, implying a complete exchange rate pass-through. Another explanation is distribution costs, with foreign exporters selling goods to local importers/distributors at prices quoted in foreign currency and distributors then reselling goods in the local market at prices quoted in local currency. If they operate in a competitive market, importers/distributors will partly absorb any e ects of exchange rate changes by varying their mark-ups, so the pass-through will be incomplete. Finally, in oligopolistic markets, the response of prices to changes in costs depends both on the curvature of demand and 8 See, for example, Engel (1999) , Parsley and Wei (2001) , Goldberg (2005, 2006b ), Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005) and Parsley and Popper (2010) .
9 See Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007) for an example in the beer market and Nakamura and Zerom (2010) for an example in the co ee industry. Feenstra (1989) and Gron and Swenson (2000) are examples of studies in the automobile market. the market structure.
10 Contrary to most of this theoretical literature, we obtain incomplete ERPT in a model of PCP and without substantial local inputs or distribution costs.
The key element of our model is the signaling role of the exchange rate under dispersed information.
Exchange Rate-Consumer Price (ERCP) Puzzle. ERPT is usually the highest for imported goods prices, lower for producer prices and lowest for consumer prices.
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Several previous explanations have been o ered for this hierarchy of pass-through e ects.
The rst is that as imported goods reach consumers through wholesale and retail networks, their prices accumulate a substantial local input of services, such as transportation, marketing and advertising; this accumulation partly cushions the impact of exchange rate changes on nal retail prices.
12 Engel and Rogers (1996) , however, study the behavior of consumer prices between cities in Canada and the United States, which share a very large and relatively open border, and present evidence suggesting that geographical distance is not the main determinant of the lack of consumer price sensitivity to exchange rate movements. A second explanation is that imports are mainly intermediate goods to which foreign currency pricing applies, so the pass-through is complete for prices on the docks.
In contrast, retail prices, as a combination of imported and local goods prices, are set in local currency and are adjusted only periodically due to price rigidity, menu costs or other dynamic factors. 13 However, a recent work by Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010) documents low pass-through at the dock in the US Exchange. A third explanation is that consumers switch from imported goods to lower-quality, cheaper local brands when larger exchange rate depreciations occur, as described by Burstein et al. (2005) . Similarly, when the local currency strengthens, consumers might switch to higher-quality, more expensive brands, so in ation might not decline in tandem with exchange rate appreciation.
Our explanation of the ERCP puzzle relies on the idea, supported by empirical ndings, that rms within a country know more about their own country than foreign rms do 14 .
The signaling e ect of exchange rates is lower in export pricing than in domestic pricing because exporters have more precise information about their own country's fundamental than domestic rms do.
Declining ERPT. Another important nding in the literature is that exchange rate pass-through is higher for emerging market countries and declines over time for both advanced and emerging market countries. 15 Three explanations have been proposed for this nding. The rst explanation relates to the above-mentioned macroeconomic stability. The second explanation focuses on shifts in the composition of imports from high pass-through goods to low pass-through goods, as in .
In the more developed countries, the pass-through is nearly complete for energy and raw materials and is considerably lower than unity for food and manufactured products.
A shift in the composition of imports from raw materials to manufactured goods could thus lead to a decline in the measured exchange rate pass-through for both import and consumer prices. The third explanation is that the globalization of economic activity has increased competition and the contestability of markets and reduced the pricing power of dominant rms in the tradable sector. In such an environment, rms may have to absorb temporary cost increases that are due to exchange rate movements, thereby reducing the exchange rate pass-through. To maintain pro t margins, rms may outsource production to lower-cost countries, including the ones to which they are exporting, a change that might further reduce the pass-through. In our model, the nominal exchange rate acts as a signal about the fundamentals. If this signal becomes less precise, re ecting an increase in macroeconomic instability, rms attach less weight to it. We can then analyze the e ect of not only country-speci c volatilities but also global volatility on ERPT.
An Organizing Framework
Our discussion is framed by a completely standard auto-parts model similar to the one used by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003 
Actions
We consider the following decision rules: unobserved Foreign fundamental .
while the optimal ( nal or consumer good) price p h for a nal good producer h equals the expectation with respect to h 0 s information set = h of a convex combination of the exogenous unobserved Home fundamental and the average Home price of imports
where r 2 (0; 1) is the share of imports in Home production, p f e + p f is the Home currency (import) price of p f and e is the nominal exchange rate measured in units of
Home currency per unit of Foreign currency.
Consider rst the exporters. Pricing rule (1) can be interpreted as the best response of monopolistic competitive rms using labor as the only input. We show in the Appendix that the underlying fundamental may represent exogenous costs of production or exogenous aggregate nominal demand conditions in the Foreign country. Now consider domestic pricing. We adopt an auto-parts model to highlight the e ects of dispersed information in pass-through in the most direct way. The continuum of nal producers of mass one assembles intermediate imports to produce nal goods. As a result, the pricing rule (2) can also represent monopolistic competitive behavior, with the slight di erence that not only labor but also Foreign intermediate products are used as inputs.
Once again, the underlying fundamental can be interpreted as exogenous labor cost or exogenous aggregate nominal demand conditions in the Home country.
Timing and Information
After presenting the agents and their actions, we need to de ne the information structure of the model. In accordance with the pertinent literature, we consider that, instead of observing the fundamentals, each rm observes a private signal x about its own country's fundamental and a private signal y about the external fundamental.
18 In addition, all rms observe a public signal e, the nominal exchange rate, relating the two fundamentals.
Assumption 2 (Timing and Information) The fundamentals and are drawn from (improper) uniform priors over the real line, but a nal producer h observes private signals
while an exporter f observes
In addition, all rms observe a public signal e, the nominal exchange rate e = f ( ; ) + ; N (0; quantity-theory approach to aggregate demand, where (log) velocities are assumed to be constants at zero. Then, the equilibrium nominal exchange rate e = f ( ; ) = is proportional to relative money supplies. This relationship is analogous to the equilibrium expression for the exchange rate in the two-country model of Devereux and Engel (2002) , in which real balances enter the utility function logarithmically. If we consider as shortrun deviations of equilibrium unrelated to any speci c country, we obtain e as our noisy public signal about the underlying fundamentals.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium prices are functions of the signals observed by rms. As a result, the price
while the price p h of a nal producer h depends on h 0 s information set = h = fx h ; y h ; eg
The state of the world is given by the realizations of fundamentals and signals. Because the private signal's errors are independent and identically distributed across agents, any aggregate variable is a function only of the fundamentals ( ; ) and the public signal e.
a unique dataset, the Global Competitiveness Survey. Their ndings suggest that local managers do have valuable information about the country where they reside. ? examines whether analysts resident in a country make more precise earnings forecasts for rms in that country than non-resident analysts. Using a sample of 32 countries, the authors nd an economically and statistically signi cant local analyst advantage even after controlling for rm and analyst characteristics.
Under the proposed information structure, we are able to express the expected values of the fundamentals as functions of the signals. For a nal producer h, we obtain
while for a exporter f , we have
where the weights on e are functions of the variances
The weights and measure the contribution of the nominal exchange rate in explaining the rm's own-country fundamental. In this sense, a nal producer attributes weight to the nominal exchange rate in the process of forecasting the fundamental of the Home country while exporters attach a weight to the nominal exchange rate when forecasting the fundamental of the Foreign country. Following the same reasoning, the weights and measure the contribution of the nominal exchange rate to explaining a fundamental from another country.
Results
We are now able to map the solution of the model with the stylized facts of ERPT. First, we isolate the informational component of our model by setting r = 1. Later, we consider how local costs (r 6 = 1) a ects pass-through.
The Signaling E ect of Nominal Exchange Rates
Before we analyze ERPT under dispersed information, it is useful to rst consider the complete-information benchmark.
Result 1 (ERPT under Complete Information) Consider that and are common knowledge. In the absence of local costs (r = 1), all exporters set prices equal to the Foreign fundamental while all nal producers set prices equal to the Foreign fundamental plus the nominal exchange rate, e. As a result, ERPT both to imports and nal prices are complete:
Result 1 o ers two benchmarks. The rst relies only on information in the Foreign economy: if it is complete, then ERPT to imports is also complete. The second benchmark depends also on our simplifying assumption about domestic inputs: if we isolate the e ects of information and set r = 1, ERPT to nal goods is also complete, and there is no exchange rate-consumer price (ERCP) puzzle. If this is not the case, pass-through to nal goods becomes incomplete and equals the share r 2 (0; 1) of imports in Home production.
Now, consider the case of dispersed information. Result 2 links the equilibrium prices of imports to the rst stylized fact about ERPT.
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Result 2 (Incomplete ERPT) The equilibrium price of an exporter f under dispersed information equals the exporter's expected value of the foreign fundamental
where
As a result, the equilibrium prices of imports are (10) meaning that ERPT to imports, 2 (0; 1) ; is incomplete.
In our model, the nominal exchange rate has two distinct e ects. The rst is the standard role of converting Foreign currency prices into Home currency prices. We consider, however, that the nominal exchange rate also reveals information about economic fundamentals:
Considering just the conversion e ect, changes in e leads to proportional changes in a Home currency import price p f , while the price expressed in the producer currency, p f , remains constant. In our model, however, the export price p f also varies due to the signaling e ect of the nominal exchange rate. If this is the case, a change in e may induce variability in p f through signaling that partially o sets the variability in p f due to conversion. This result is consistent with empirical evidence that indicates that variability in exchange rates closely tracks the variability in p f , while p f remains fairly stable. It is also an alternative explanation for incomplete pass-trough. Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008) argue that for p f to co-vary with exchange rates, it must be true that exchange rates lead to a change in markups, a change in marginal cost or both. Instead, in our model, information about marginal costs attached in the nominal exchange rate a ects ERPT, even though marginal costs may remain xed. Finally, this result reconciles the apparent incompatibility of producer currency pricing and incomplete ERPT.
The next step is to obtain nal prices in the Home country. Note that p F = (1 ) +
[ + e]. We just need to substitute this result in (2) and use both (3) and (4) to compute Home prices. This result maps directly to the second stylized fact about ERPT.
Result 3 (ERCP Puzzle) In the absence of local costs (r = 1), the equilibrium price of a nal producer under dispersed information equals Home rms' expected value of average
where ERPT to nal prices is incomplete and given by
meaning that nal prices react less than import prices to exchange rates if and only if
We argue that the ERCP puzzle naturally arises in two steps. First, note that the ERCP puzzle becomes more likely to happen as the non-fundamental exchange rate variability 2 e increases. Thus, in the most adverse scenario for condition (12) to hold, 2 e = 0, we obtain
. Second, if rms within a country know more about their own country's fundamental than foreign rms, as supported by empirical evidence, we
and condition (12) is satis ed 21 . In our model without local costs (r = 1), the nominal exchange rate e is used in diverse ways depending on the type of rm being considered. Exporters use e to obtain information about their own country's fundamental, , while home rms use e to obtain information about the external fundamental, . The signaling e ect of exchange rates is lower in export pricing than in nal producer pricing because exporters have more precise private information about their own country's fundamental x f than do nal producers (y h ). As a result, the signaling e ect partially o sets the conversion e ect of Foreign currency export prices, p f , into 21 Examples of empirical evidence are in footnote 19.
Home currency import prices, p f , but not enough to compensate for the lower precision of Home information about .
Macroeconomic Stability and ERPT
Finally, we use our framework to the deal with the link between ERPT and macroeconomic stability. To keep the model simple, we consider that, instead of observing private signals, rms have the following priors distributions about the fundamentals:
If this is the case, our model without local costs (r = 1) simpli es to: We are now able to analyze the e ects of macroeconomic instability on ERPT; this analysis covers the third stylized fact about pass-through
Result 4 (Macroeconomic Stability and ERPT) In the absence of local costs (r = 1),
ERPT increases with non-fundamental exchange rate variability
The same is true if there is an increase in the country s volatility of the nal producers
while the opposite is true regarding the volatility of the country of the exporters
The rationale behind Result 4 lies once again in the view of the nominal exchange rate as a signal about the fundamentals. If a signal becomes less precise, rms attach less weight to it. As a result, if 2 e increases, the signaling e ect of the nominal exchange rate decreases. For export prices, this is translated into a small value of 1 . Imports and nal prices, however, also depend on the conversion e ect, which remains unchanged.
For import prices, as the signaling e ect (1 ) decreases in modulus, the sum of conversion and signaling e ects, , increases. The same is true for nal prices. As a result, ERPT increases to both import and nal prices.
We now investigate the role of country s volatilities in pass-through. An increase in the volatility of the Foreign country means that the "signal" is less precise. If this is the case, exporters attach more weight to the composed "signal" e; which, given the conversion e ect, decreases the ERPT to imports . Analogously, nal producers rely less in the composed signal + e, inducing a decrease in the ERPT to nal goods . The same logic can be applied when there is an increase in the volatility of the Home country.
The Role of Local Costs
We now consider the role of local costs in pricing decisions. ERPT to imports is una ected while ERPT to consumer prices becomes r + r (1 ) 2 (0; 1) :
A direct implication is that if Home nal goods sold to consumers incorporate a signi cant share of local costs, consumer prices will be less sensitive to exchange rate changes. As a result, we can interpret relation (12) (14) of Result 4. The value 1 r of local costs thus functions as a limit to the signaling e ect of exchange rates in a ecting ERPT to nal prices.
Conclusion
Considering that the nominal exchange rate imperfectly conveys information about the underlying fundamentals when information is dispersed in the economy, we are able to manage three stylized facts of ERPT in a simple and stylized auto-parts model: (i) ERPT is incomplete, (ii) ERPT is usually higher for imported goods prices than for consumer prices and (iii) ERPT is higher for emerging market countries and declines over time for both advanced and emerging market economies.
We show how the observation of the nominal exchange rate may a ect pass-through in a model of incomplete information. We treat the nominal exchange rate as a noisy public signal relating domestic and foreign fundamentals and where the variance of the noisy term may re ect the degree of macroeconomic instability. If this is the case, export prices also vary due to the signaling e ect of the nominal exchange rate. Thus, a change in the nominal exchange rate may induce variability in export prices through signaling that partially o sets variability in import prices due to conversion. This result is consistent with empirical evidence showing that variability in exchange rates closely tracks the variability in export prices in the producer's currency, whereas import prices in the local currency remain fairly stable.
The rationale behind the idea of the signaling role of exchange rates is based on three central issues in macroeconomics. The rst is the role of private and public signals under dispersed information. The second is the link between economic fundamentals and exchange rate behavior. The third is the impact of macroeconomic stability on the documented slowdown in the pass-through in recent decades.
To obtain the main results of our model, we diverged from much of the literature by ignoring substantial local costs and local currency pricing. The key elements of our model are the signaling role of the exchange rate under dispersed information and the notion of informational home-bias, or how much more rms within a country know about their own country's fundamental than foreign rms.
We can easily extend the model to include a more complex chain of production, as in Areosa (2011 
where Y h is the output of a Home rm of type h, Y h;f is the input supplied to h by a Foreign rm of type f 2 F = [0; 1], > 1 is function of the elasticity of substitution between Foreign goods, L h is the labor input used by h and r 2 (0; 1) is the share of composite of Foreign goods in h' production. Home rms behave as imperfect competitors in their output markets and are price-takers in their input markets. Given the constant-returnsto-scale technologies, the unit cost is also the marginal cost and is rm-independent. The optimal price decision under exible prices is just a mark-up over marginal costs
where r r
is a price index for Foreign imported goods and W H is nominal wage per hour in the Home country.
We consider a labor supply decision of the Home representative household of the form
where consumption C H is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) composite of the Home nal goods
We combine equations (17), (18) and (19) to obtain
The production of each Foreign intermediate good requires labor services only, with a constant-returns-to-scale technology given by Y f = L f , where L f is the labor input and Y f is the output of a Foreign rm f . Foreign rms also behave as imperfect competitors in their output markets and are price-takers in their input markets. As a result, the optimal price decision under exible prices is
where W F is nominal wage per hour in the Foreign country. If the labor supply decision of the Foreign representative household is analogous to (18), we obtain
where P Y is nominal aggregate demand in the Foreign country expressed in Foreign currency. Note that we are not considering P F h R 1 0 P f 1 1 df i 1 = P because we are modeling just the fraction of the Foreign economy that is necessary for our results.
Log-linearizing conditions (20) and (21) (2), which can be found in Woodford (2002) and Mankiw and Reis (2010) , re ect the certainty-equivalence result that a price with imperfect information equals the expected price under full information. As pointed out in Mankiw and Reis (2010) , this equivalence holds because a linearization of the optimality conditions is equivalent to a quadratic approximation of the objective function.
Proofs of Results

Proof of Result 1 (ERPT under Complete Information).
If information is complete, the external price of any given exporter equals the Foreign fundamental
As a result, the price of any imported good is p f = p F = e + . Now, consider the prices of Home rms. Under complete information, all Home nal goods' rms set the same price p h = (1 r) + r [e + ] :
Setting r = 1 establishes the result
Proof of Result 2 (Incomplete ERPT). Under dispersed information, the optimal response for an exporter is
As a result, import prices are 
